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it is, to resolve this time consistency problem by protecting the long-term value of the currency even
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century—the global financial crisis of 2008 and the 2016 election—have changed this standard narrative.
Today, the U.S. Federal Reserve and other central banks are more likely to face political pressures to raise
interest rates rather than lower them. This chapter explores how this new political economy of central
banking, in the face of long-term low interest rates, changes the posture of central banks against the rest
of the polity. It discusses some history of political pressures against central banks in other climates and
makes predictions about how the “new normal” of lower interest rates will challenge the Fed’s ability to
stay above the political fray, despite its best intentions.
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Chapter 2
Politics, Independence, and Retirees:
Long-term Low Interest Rates at the
US Federal Reserve
Peter Conti-Brown

President Donald Trump has frequently compared himself to one of his
most important predecessors, Andrew Jackson, and has hung Jackson’s
portrait in the Oval Ofﬁce. While Mr. Trump has not elaborated on the
comparison, it is not difﬁcult to draw the parallels. Old Hickory is perceived
to be the father of populism, an irascible opponent to much of the prevailing political order of his day. Donald Trump sees himself the same way: as an
outsider who challenged the existing hierarchy and won.1
There is a signiﬁcant extra dimension to the comparison, though, that
points to an important relationship in government that will far outlive the
Trump presidency. Jackson was also the sworn enemy of the Second Bank of
the United States, a quasi-private institution that functioned as the nation’s
central bank (as that term was understood at the time). As described in
more detail below, different presidents can and do interact with central
banking institutions in different ways. That interaction, though, tells us an
enormous amount about the ways that interest-rate policies are politicized,
and to what ends. This reality for the Federal Reserve (Fed) is no different
in the 21st century than it was for the Bank of the United States in the
19th century.2
The fact that the Fed is now occupying a front-and-center role in the
political arena is not a comfortable place for the central bankers who run it.
Nevertheless, this role is not new. Since the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008,
the Fed has rarely receded from the political maelstrom, for better or worse.
This chapter charts this political terrain, focusing on a question that is as
much economic as it is political: why are interest rates so low, and what does
the Fed have to do with it? Whether the Fed dictates the national (and
international) interest rate climate, or is merely a victim to secular economic
trends in productivity is an ongoing debate, which I summarize but do not
fully engage. Of more pressing interest is how the Fed is perceived politically, as combatant in that process. Low interest rates represent a profound
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political problem for the Fed. Not only do they arguably violate the Fed’s
often forgotten third mandate to maintain ‘moderate long-term interest
rates,’ they also scramble the political constituencies that have normally
defended the central bank against attempts at political interference. As a
result, when political push comes to existential shove, the Fed’s monetary
policy actions since 2008 risk alienating another important group: pensioners and other retirees who count on higher interest rates for their
economic security and who have historically been staunch defenders of an
independent central bank.
The members of the Federal Reserve System are some of the best political
inﬁghters in Washington. They have survived extraordinary assaults on its
independence and structure throughout the last century. Time and time
again, the Fed has not only survived, but thrived.3 But the challenges ahead
will be different, and they will require something more than the Fed has
done before.
In what follows, the ﬁrst section discusses the nature of equilibrium interest
rates and the Fed’s (in)ability to inﬂuence them. I also show that the perception that the Fed can control real interest rates is not simply public misinformation; it is also written into law. The second section traces the history of the
Fed’s own self-description as an independent central bank designed precisely
for the purpose of dictating higher interest rates than politicians would
prefer. Long-term efforts to push this narrative have now come back to
haunt the Fed as it continues to maintain independence while pursuing the
central goal of keeping nominal interest rates at historic lows. The third
section details the consequences of the 2016 election for low interest rates.
One note on the chapter’s US-based focus: though the politics and history
described below focus on the Fed, major central banks in other parts of the
world are facing very similar dynamics. They have been billed as economically omniscient, but their tools for addressing the most pressing economic
realities that affect retirees are limited.
As with so much else about the political environment, uncertainty clouds
every informed discussion of the Fed’s future—and the future path of
interest rates—during the Trump administration and beyond. Yet there
are also dynamics at play that could push nominal interest rates down, not
up. The focus for academic, policy, and industry commentators will be on
these political dynamics.

The Fed’s Role in Determining Low Interest Rates
and the Forgotten Third Mandate
The US Congress created the Federal Reserve System in 1913 after a century
of national experimentation with nearly every aspect of banking and central
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banking. Today, the Fed has grown into something that its framers would
not have predicted: it has become the regulator par excellence not only of
the banking system, but also of the macroeconomy itself. It is, as former Fed
Chair Paul Volcker once said, the ‘only game in town’ (Silber 2012: 201).
This has led to the present moment, when the Fed has not only changed the
way that banks are funded and regulated during and after ﬁnancial crisis,
but also how interest rates have been brought to historically low levels.
Indeed, the Fed is now in an unusual position: while it has focused on
ﬁghting inﬂation and stabilizing employment, two of its statutory mandates,
it has failed for just the second time in its modern history to deliver on its
often forgotten third mandate: to maintain moderate long-term interest
rates (see Figure 2.1).
Interest rates are not simply low: they are historically low. This is obviously
true for short-term interest rates, which have hovered at or below the zerolower bound in major economies since the Great Recession. But, as
Figure 2.1 illustrates, this is part of a longer trend for short-term interest
rates, too. This observation then prompts a new question: why?
This development is part of a longer-term trend that economist Mohamed
El-Erian (2016) called the ‘new normal,’ coming out of the global ﬁnancial
crisis. Most economists (and certainly central bankers) will argue that the Fed
has little to do with this phenomenon. The Fed has remarkable authority in
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Figure 2.1. Ten-year Treasury constant maturity rate
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2017).
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controlling short-term nominal interest rates by deploying its balance sheets
in a variety of different credit markets. But, as former Fed Chairman Ben
Bernanke (2015: np) wrote, real interest rates—the rates most relevant for
long-term investment decisions—‘are determined by a wide range of economic factors, including prospects for economic growth—not by the Fed.’
The problem is that the Fed controls nominal interest rates and, usually,
the nominal short-term interest rates at which banks lend to each other. By
contrast, it has less control over what is often called the ‘Wicksellian interest
rate,’ or the real interest rate consistent with full employment of labor and
capital, named for Swedish economist Knut Wicksell (1936) who advanced
the concept in 1898. The idea that the Fed is as much a victim of these
trends as the rest of us stems from the idea that the factors determining the
full deployment of labor and capital are not for the Fed to decide. Instead,
these are a consequence of technological innovation, demographics, even
culture, and certainly governmental ﬁscal policy, social policy, and the
robustness of the ﬁnancial system. In other words, the Fed as the monetary
authority has one not-very-useful instrument, namely short-term nominal
interest rates. This instrument cannot dictate the Wicksellian interest rate
unilaterally; the best the Fed can do is nudge nominal interest rates toward
its estimated Wicksellian rate layer. Indeed, once we focus on that real
rate—that is, the interest rate minus inﬂation—the graph would look even
worse. If this view is true, then again the question becomes: why?
One explanation comes from a Depression-era theory from Alvin Hansen
(1938), one of the economists who ﬁrst operationalized Keynesian macroeconomic theory. In the middle of the second of the two severe recessions of
the 1930s, Hansen hypothesized that the equilibrium interest rate was so low
not because of the sudden, idiosyncratic collapse of aggregate demand à la
Keynesian theory, but because of something deeper. His analysis of the
situation has gained inﬂuence lately, but mainly through summaries offered
by others. Hansen’s original perspective is worth citing in full:
The business cycle was par excellence the problem of the nineteenth century.
But the main problem of our times, and particularly in the United States, is the
problem of full employment. Yet paradoxical as it may seem, the nineteenth
century was little concerned with, and understood but dimly, the character of
the business cycle. Indeed, so long as the problem of full employment was not
pressing, it was not necessary to worry unduly about the temporary unemployment incident to the swings of the cycle. Not until the problem of full employment of our productive resources from the long-run, secular standpoint was
upon us, were we compelled to give serious consideration to those factors and
forces in our economy which tend to make business recoveries weak and
anaemic and which tend to prolong and deepen the course of depressions.
This is the essence of secular stagnation—sick recoveries which die in their
infancy and depressions which feed on themselves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment. (Hansen 1939: 4)
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From Hansen’s perspective, then, all recoveries would be weak because
something fundamental had changed about the economy. It wasn’t a problem of depression; it was a problem of productivity and demographics.
No economist has done more to bring Hansen’s perspective back to the
debate about the ‘new normal’ than Harvard economist Lawrence Summers. From his view, Hansen’s theory was right but untimely: ‘Hansen
turned out to be completely wrong but completely wrong in a way that
suggests that at some future point he could turn out to be right’
(Summers 2016: 96). Today, then, the anemic recovery from the ﬁnancial
crisis of 2008 and the subsequent recession is what we should expect. Low
Wicksellian rates are a more-or-less permanent feature of the landscape.
Productivity, from this perspective, is a thing of the past.4
As far as economic theory goes, the idea of an equilibrium rate over which
the Fed has little control is mainstream, even for critics of the Fed’s monetary policies. The idea that we are in a period of secular stagnation is not.5
Yet these debates miss a much more important point when we consider the
Fed’s role in determining the interest-rate environment. The question is not
‘What is the relationship between the Fed and low interest rates?’ but,
instead, ‘How does the public perceive the relationship between the Fed
and low interest rates?’
The answer to the ﬁrst question is the theoretical and empirical question
that occupies economists and central bankers; the second is the question of
paramount political importance for those who will control the Fed’s future.
And that second answer takes a very different view of interest rates that is
widely accepted by the public, the result of a long-standing public education
program by the Fed, extending over decades, that has taken ﬁrm root in law,
political discourse, and culture. That view has made it difﬁcult to sell the
Fed’s own efforts to disclaim responsibility for low interest rates.
Public perception of interest rates pays little attention to the distinctions
between an equilibrium rate and the nominal rate, the latter of which the
Fed does in fact control. The control mechanism has an obvious economic
logic, as basic as a supply-and-demand graph from introductory economics.
Here, the supply and demand are supply of and demand for short-term bank
loans, a kind of good for which there is a market, just as there are markets
for crude oil, pineapples, or squirrel traps. The price of money in these
markets is the interest rate, here the Fed’s federal funds rate. When the Fed
makes money less available to banks to lend to each other, they will pay more
for it, and interest rates will rise. When there is more money, people will pay
less for it, and interest rates drop. While the difference between the federal
funds effective rate and the federal funds target rate is actually more
complicated than this simple explanation suggests, the basic reality is that
the Fed can and does affect interest rates through open market operations
similar to the process described above: by affecting the availability of money,
the Fed changes the price of money.6
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When the availability of resources controlled by the central bank dictates
the value of interest rates, the price-theory of nominal interest rates is
economically accurate. Nevertheless, it is not helpful for understanding
the nature of the equilibrium rate. This difference may not matter much
for economic theory, but confusion between the two is a ubiquitous feature
of public discourse on the Fed, interest rates, and public accountability. At a
2013 hearing, for example, Republican Senator Bob Corker lambasted
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke on exactly this theory: the Fed’s
continued decision to keep interest rates at the zero-lower bound had ‘thrown
seniors under the bus.’ People living on ﬁxed income and depending on more
robust interest rates, the Senator said, were run over by the Fed’s monetary
policies, apparently in service of policy oriented more toward younger generations.7 Bernanke didn’t appreciate the implication, but the idea that the Fed
is responsible for the level of moderate long-term interest rates cannot be
blamed on any given Senator. Rather, it is written in the Federal Reserve Act
itself, in the Fed’s ‘mandate.’
The idea of a mandate for central banks is an old one, yet in the United
States it found its way into the Federal Reserve Act only in 1977. At that
point, the US Congress amended the Federal Reserve Act to give the Fed its
marching orders. The revised statute is worth quoting in full, largely because
it has become a classic in the Mark Twain sense: it is cited often, but never
read. The ‘mandate’ requires:
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open
Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit
aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase
production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment,
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. (12 U.S.C. 225a.)

When discussing what the Fed does, the discussion is almost always reduced
to a ‘dual mandate’ of ‘price stability’ and ‘maximum employment.’ As Janet
Yellen (2017: np) put it, ‘[n]early 40 years ago, the Congress set two main
guideposts for that task—maximum employment and price stability. We
refer to these assigned goals as our dual mandate.’ But the statute was
broader, as it included an important third mandate: ‘to promote effectively
the goal of . . . moderate long-term interest rates.’
By nearly any deﬁnition, the Fed is now failing at that charge. Interest
rates at the zero-lower bound are not moderate, no matter how one deﬁnes
‘moderate.’ Again, most economists and most central bankers would say that
it has no control over this factor. But the failure is important because,
whether true or not, the Fed is perceived by its congressional masters as
not only having that power, but having the legal duty to use it. When the
legal authority is put in these terms, the relevant question for the Fed and its
long-term interest rates is not whether the Fed can unilaterally raise rates.
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Instead, the question is why does the public believe the Fed has this ability
at all? To address that issue, we must turn to Fed history.

The Fed’s Political Independence in History
Although the Fed’s mandate was provided through a political system, the
institution remains jealous of its prerogatives for determining how to pursue
them.8 In the important conceptualization offered by economists Guy
Debelle and Stanley Fischer (1994), the Fed has ‘instrument independence,’
not ‘goal independence.’ To prevent the Fed’s goals from becoming inordinately politicized, the bank relies on this instrument independence, a loose
term that is frequently invoked but rarely explained. In economics, and to a
lesser extent in political science, the concept of central bank independence
has been so extensively studied as to earn its own acronym: CBI.9 Alan
Blinder (2004), an academic and former central banker, called the study of
central bank independence a ‘growth industry,’ and the growth has only
accelerated in the years since.
Although there are about as many deﬁnitions of central bank independence as there are authors who describe it, we can gather from these studies
a rough consensus of what central bank independence means in reference
to the Fed. The consensus goes something like this. Federal Reserve independence refers to the separation, by statute, of the central bankers (speciﬁcally the Fed chair) from the politicians (speciﬁcally the US President),
for purposes of maintaining low inﬂation. The idea is that citizens in a
democracy naturally prefer a prosperous economy. Politicians seek to please
the population by giving that prosperity, or at least trying to take credit for it.
But when there is no prosperity to be had, politicians will resort to supporting the economy artiﬁcially by running the printing presses to provide
enough money and credit for all. The short-term result is re-election for
the politicians. The long-term result is worthless money that wreaks havoc
on our economic, social, and political institutions.
Several widely invoked metaphors of central banking come tumbling
forth: in the Homeric epic, the Odyssey, when Odysseus (referred to in
central banking circles by his Latin name Ulysses) ventured with his men
close to the seductive and vexing Sirens, he devised a scheme to allow his
men to guide their ship past their seduction in safety, while he experienced
the short-term joys of hearing their songs (Elster 1977). Central bank
independence is our ‘Ulysses contract.’ We write central banking laws that
lash us (and our politicians) to the mast and stuff bees-wax in the ears of our
central bankers. We enjoy the ride while the technocratic central bankers
guide the ship of the economy to the land of prosperity and low inﬂation.
(The public, by the way, represents the Sirens in this metaphor.)
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The other commonly invoked metaphor is even more colorful. In the oftrepeated words of William McChesney Martin (1955), the longest serving
Fed chair in history, the Fed is ‘in the position of the chaperone who has
ordered the punch bowl removed just when the party was really warming
up.’ The subjects of the metaphors differ across the millennia, but the idea is
the same: the partygoers and Ulysses alike want something in the near term
that their best selves know is bad for them in the long term. Central bank
independence is the solution.
It is the last feature of the Ulysses/chaperone conception of independence that matters for our understanding of the Fed’s ‘new normal’ of longterm low interest rates: the idea that the Fed can use technocratic expertise
to accomplish its goal of price stability. This notion of Fed independence,
and the reasons for it, are so entrenched in the academic and public
imagination that deviations from this view present complications even in
the Fed’s own self-image, to say nothing of how the Fed is perceived externally. And now, when the Fed appears to be pursuing a policy of keeping
interest rates low rather than raising them high, then the Ulysses/chaperone
model starts to fail.
To understand this dynamic, and where it came from, we need to know
more about why the Fed was created and how it changed over time.
A conventional retelling of the Fed’s history is that it was a response to the
problem of JP Morgan’s mortality. There was a ﬁnancial panic in 1907, as
there had been so many times throughout the 19th century, and, as he
had before, Morgan—the famous head of a banking dynasty—had stepped
in to save the day. Afterward, the public and members of Congress decided
to do what they had failed to do before: create a central bank that would
endure.10
The real story of the Fed’s founding is much more complex than this. The
time between the Panic of 1907 and the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 made a
big difference to the shape the Fed ultimately took, including the strange
relationship between the Federal Reserve Board and the 12 quasiautonomous Federal Reserve Banks. But most important for understanding
the current context of low interest rates was the political constituencies for
having a central bank at all. Farmers and others likely to be chronically
indebted were hostile to the idea of banker control over currency and its
value; bankers, on the other hand, were not.
Our understanding of the structure of interest rates and central bank
inﬂuence over interest rates was different, in large part because the world
was different. When the Federal Reserve Act was ﬁrst passed, the United
States was on the gold standard and sought to gain access to international
markets also on the gold standard (Broz 1997). As the Fed transitioned to
playing a greater role in setting national and international macroeconomic
conditions, the perception of its role changed, too.
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Perhaps the greatest inﬂuence on the public perception of the Fed was
William McChesney Martin, Jr., Fed Chairman from 1951 to 1970, and
author of the ‘chaperone’ conception of the central bank role. Martin
came to the Fed with a long familiarity with its operations, as his father was
the Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The son had also
worked as president of the New York Stock Exchange in the late 1930s, and
then as president again of the Export–Import Bank. By 1951, he was the
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for monetary affairs in the Truman
administration.11
It was an interesting time to be at the Treasury. The United States had
recently discovered that the Soviets had successfully tested an atomic
weapon, three years sooner than American estimates. Conﬂict on the
Korean peninsula threatened to plunge the world once again into global
war. Most importantly for understanding the Fed’s political constraints, it
was in intense conﬂict with the US Treasury. The Fed had been subsidizing
US government securities since the beginning of World War II and was
agitating to stop. The Treasury wanted the subsidy to continue and refused
to budge.
Eventually, the conﬂict came to a head, but not until President Truman
had summoned the Federal Open Market Committee to the Oval Ofﬁce to
berate it for the ﬁrst and last time in history. With Martin as the Treasury’s
lead negotiator, the Fed and Treasury reached what came to be called the
Fed–Treasury Accord of 1951. The Accord was a public announcement that
the Federal Reserve and Treasury had agreed that the Treasury would no
longer dictate to the Fed the interest rates that Treasury would expect the
Fed to support in the public markets. For many, this is considered a ‘major
achievement’ in American history (Meltzer 2003: 711). In fact, the Accord
did not do much on its own: it was just a single-sentence announcement.
Here it is in full:
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have reached full accord with
respect to debt management and monetary policies to be pursued in furthering
their common purpose to assure the successful ﬁnancing of the Government’s
requirements and, at the same time, to minimize monetization of the public
debt. (Board of Governors 1952).

All this statement says is that the Fed and Treasury agreed on the twin aims
of ‘successful ﬁnancing of the Government’s requirements’ and the minimization of the ‘monetization of the public debt.’
Probably as part of the Accord itself, Fed Chairman Thomas McCabe
stepped down and Martin replaced him. But soon, Martin took a very
different approach to his role and sought not only to balance those two
goals: he also declared the Fed independent of the Treasury for purposes of
determining monetary policy completely. President Truman, once Martin’s
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patron, now looked at him very differently. On Martin’s report, at their next
meeting at an event at a New York City hotel, Truman had but one word to
say to the affable Martin: ‘Traitor!’ (Bremner 2004: 91).
Given that so little was determined by the Accord itself, Martin had to use
his own leadership to ﬁll in the gaps. Martin accomplished this in various
ways, but one of the most important was not via market intervention or
political ﬁghting, but by language. It is difﬁcult to overstate Martin’s love for
metaphors: his public speeches are full of them. The chaperone language
was not his only enduring image. He also stated that, ‘lean against the winds
of deﬂation or inﬂation, whichever way they are blowing.’ He also argued
that the economy was like a river: the Fed’s aspiration was for money and
credit to ‘ﬂow . . . like a stream. This stream or river is ﬂowing through the
ﬁelds of business and commerce. We don’t want the water to overﬂow the
banks of the stream, ﬂooding and drowning what is in the ﬁelds. Neither do
we want the stream to dry up, and leave the ﬁelds parched.’12
In practice, Martin was able to use this kind of language to thwart efforts
to trim the Fed’s sails or be bullied by politicians. After he had accepted one
of Lyndon Johnson’s infamous invitations to tour the President’s Texas
ranch at blistering speeds with Johnson driving recklessly, Martin took the
opportunity to point out a large boulder interfering with the ﬂow of the river
on the property. Martin explained to Johnson that raising the discount rate
was like removing that boulder: it would let credit, like water, run more
smoothly. When Martin recounted the exchange to Fed staffers, they quickly
corrected the Fed Chairman: that’s not how discount rates work. Martin
responded: ‘Well, it did this time.’13
Another metaphor was the idea that the Fed could take away the punch
bowl, and also decide who should be drinking and when. Central bankers’
insistence on their ability to execute this strategy meant, in time, that there
was a trust that the Fed would be able to resolve the time inconsistency
problem very easily, and always in the direction of the uncomfortably higher
interest rates. This conception stands in painful contrast to Bernanke’s
insistence on Wicksellian interest rates and the central bank’s inability to
dictate interest rates to the economy. Later historical developments in Fed
history only added to the perception of omnipotence, including the fall of
Arthur Burns and the rise of the Great Inﬂation, Paul Volcker and the
skyrocketing interest rates that ﬁnally broke inﬂation’s back, and Alan
Greenspan as the ‘maestro’ economic tinkerer without peer.
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 was another historical watershed for the
Federal Reserve, for many reasons. First, the crisis brought the Fed front
and center to the public’s attention in largely unfavorable ways. Second, the
idea that the Fed bailed out Wall Street through the extraordinary deployment of billions of dollars took root in the public’s mind, and not favorably.
In other words, the Fed’s unconventional monetary policy actions in the
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aftermath of the crisis occurred when everyone was watching, which
prompted a populist backlash not anticipated by Martin’s conception of
Fed independence. Instead of insisting that the Fed leave the punch bowl on
the table, the populist protestors were opposed to low interest rates. The
debtors who would beneﬁt most from artiﬁcially low interest rates were
either silent during the political debate, or they misunderstood the ramiﬁcations of the Fed’s policies. So it was that Texas Governor and presidential
contender Rick Perry in 2011 lambasted the Fed with violent imagery:
‘Printing more money to play politics at this particular time in American
history is almost . . . treasonous,’ he said. ‘I don’t know what y’all would do to
him in Iowa, but we would treat him pretty ugly down in Texas’ (Zeleny and
Calmes 2011: np).
The simultaneous depiction of the Fed as controlling interest rates and
using them to abuse those who would require a higher return on their
investments is, then, a deeply rooted one. My point is that the Fed itself
was the author of this public idea and drove it deeply into the public psyche
in the service of preserving its independence. Now that it requires public
support for the opposite reasons, that support will be difﬁcult to come by. The
political alliances that have previously supported the Fed were built on a
notion that does not apply when the equilibrium rate is low.

The Fed During the Trump Administration
Prior to the US presidential election of 2016, the prevailing view was that
Donald Trump was too toxic to too many political constituencies to win the
general election. In central banking circles, the debate about the equilibrium rate was focused on the question of secular stagnation, not on the
inﬂationary pressures that ﬁscal policy can create.
What a difference a presidential election made! The election of 2016 was
a deﬁning moment for the Fed, with potent consequences for both real and
nominal interest rates. For real interest rates, if the Trump administration
adopts policies that change the underlying nature of the investment climate
and the productive deployment of labor and capital, then the equilibrium
rate could rise again. The equity markets, at least initially, treated the
election as indicative of accelerated growth, with only modest increases in
inﬂation expectations.
How nominal interest rates develop will be a more interesting dilemma.
The Fed has accelerated its campaign to tighten interest rates, a process that
began in December 2015. If the Fed’s expectations are to be heeded—and
to be clear, these projections have been chronically off-target—then we
should expect to see a federal funds rate in the 3 percent range by 2019.14
Yet many factors are at play. Not least is how the Fed will be reshaped during
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the Trump administration, since he has the opportunity to ﬁll several
vacancies on the board. Every president has the statutory and constitutional
right to make these appointments and uses them to inﬂuence his agenda.
Trump will be no different.15
Predicting President Trump’s agenda is no easy matter, and the point of
this chapter is not to stay rooted in the present but to articulate broader
applications of political dynamics that will extend into the future. Even so, it
is useful to think through how the Trump administration’s approach to
interest rate policies will inﬂuence Fed decision-making. In the past, presidents from both parties generally favored central bankers who lowered
interest rates for reasons the Ulysses/chaperone conception of Fed independence anticipated: it is helpful to win elections and preserve legacies
when the economy is booming, even if that boom is only on the back of
cheap currency. Yet during the Obama administration, Republicans consistently criticized the Fed for these very low interest rates. It is unclear whether
the Trump coalition will pursue a more hawkish monetary policy consistent
with those 2009–2016 critiques, or favor presidential prerogatives, as has
been historically true.
Appointments, though, are not the only mechanism that presidents have
for inﬂuencing the Fed. The other mechanism, used throughout history, is
to deploy the many non-legal mechanisms at a president’s disposal to
inﬂuence central bankers. President Trump’s decision to appoint Jerome
Powell to succeed Janet Yellen as Fed Chair may have reassured some that
the Fed will continue to have its independence in determining monetary
policy. But President Trump, like so many of his predecessors, may also
develop strong ideas about the appropriate direction that interest rates will
take. If the Fed engages in tightening interest rates to cool the economy, he
may seek to impose political constraints on the Fed preventing it from
moving too quickly. In that case, the Fed’s nominal interest rates may
undershoot the equilibrium rate—and in the process, cause an overheating
economy to trigger inﬂation. If that occurs, it will in fact be the Fed—not the
economy—that is keeping interest rates artiﬁcially low.

Conclusions
This chapter has argued that the Fed’s status as ‘chaperone’ given independence by Congress for the purpose of constraining inﬂationary ﬁscal
policy has backﬁred during times when the Fed has pursued the opposite
tack. A Fed trying to keep the party from getting out of control as an
omnipotent central banker is an image that has taken hold in the public
imagination in a way that few if any governmental agencies can match. That
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is an altogether different image from a Fed trying to get a bunch of
wallﬂowers to take tequila shots.
It is little wonder, given the decades-long effort to construct an inﬂationﬁghting central bank, that this abrupt change has caused so much backlash.
And it is not enough to claim that the public’s misunderstanding on these
issues reﬂects a burden that the public itself must correct. The law requires
the Fed to pursue moderate long-term interest rates, in an almost alwaysforgotten third mandate. In any event, the reason the public believes the
Fed is an inﬂation ﬁghter is that the Fed and central bankers who work
within it have been pushing this argument for decades.
Historically, this defense of the currency against inﬂation has put retirees
as staunch defenders of an independent central bank. A world of low
interest rates credited to the Fed removes this support. Few groups feel
the effects of these rates more profoundly than those who depend on more
robust interest rates for their economic security. As Wallick et al. in
Chapter 4 of this volume have highlighted, the investment environment
for low interest rates requires dramatic changes.
The Fed has become a victim of its own success. The Fed’s ability to affect
the equilibrium rate that reﬂects the fullest deployment of labor and capital
is not absolute, nor even very strong at all. Moreover, its control over
nominal interest rates is important but often exaggerated. Presidential
administrations play a decisive role in determining how nominal and real
interest rates interact, as well as how activist Fed policy and underlying
economic realities intersect. Should a president make appointments or
otherwise inﬂuence central banking policy to be more consistently accommodative than the equilibrium rate suggests, then inﬂation will be the
consequence and the secular trend of low interest rates will become artiﬁcial, precisely as the Fed’s critics have argued has been true for years. As we
look to the future of monetary policy, the question about central banking
control and chronic low interest rates will be as much political as it is
economic.

Notes
1. For comparisons between Jackson and Trump, see Baker (2017).
2. For more on Jackson and the Second Bank of the United States, see Howe (2007).
3. For more on the Fed’s political role, see Kaiser (2013). For the Fed’s ability to gain
authority after crisis, see Shull (2005).
4. For the deep historical perspective, see Gordon (2016).
5. For the strongest counterpoint to secular stagnation, see Hamilton et al. (2015).
6. This paragraph borrows from arguments made in Conti-Brown (2016: 134).
7. See Davidson (2013) for coverage of the hearing.
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8. Drawn from Conti-Brown (2016: 2).
9. For a recent review of this extensive literature, see Fernández-Albertos (2015).
10. For more on this origin story, see Lowenstein (2015) and Bruner and Carr
(2009).
11. Bremner (2004) is a superb biography of Martin.
12. Cited by Conti-Brown (2016: 47) from an interview in US News and World
Report, February 11, 1955.
13. As recounted in Bremner (2004: 211).
14. For the Fed’s projections, see https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
fomcprojtabl20161214.htm.
15. Chang (2003) provides an excellent overview of the dynamic between President,
Congress, and the Fed at the appointment level.
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Chapter 3
Low Returns and Optimal
Retirement Savings
David Blanchett, Michael Finke, and Wade Pfau

This chapter explores how lower expected returns affect optimal saving and
spending during working years, retirement replacement rates, retirement
lifestyles, and the cost of bequests. This is important because the prices of
bonds and stocks are much higher than in the recent past, suggesting a
greater likelihood that portfolio returns will fall below the assumptions
commonly used to estimate retirement savings adequacy. Basing retirement
planning recommendations on historical returns can provide a misleading
picture about what individuals at present will need to do to smooth their
lifestyles and fund successful retirements.
We estimate a simple life cycle model to illustrate how lower future asset
returns will impact workers. Optimal lifetime spending is sensitive to expected
rates of return. Workers will need to save signiﬁcantly more to smooth
spending and they will need to spend less before and after retirement. In a
model that incorporates social security, taxes, expected longevity by earned
lifetime income, and spending patterns in retirement we ﬁnd that lowerincome workers will need to save about 50 percent more if future asset returns
resemble today’s low yield environment, and higher-income workers will need
to save as much as 100 percent more to retire at age 65. A reasonable
alternative to facing a lower level of lifetime spending is delaying retirement.

Investments have Become More Expensive
Lower investment returns must be factored into how workers plan for
retirement. Figure 3.1 compares the cost of buying $1,000 of income from
a 10-year Treasury Bond, $1,000 of stock dividends, and $1,000 of total
corporate earnings, during 20-year time periods beginning in 1955. The
ﬁgure suggests that it is now more expensive to buy income from investments than in the past, and high asset prices have persisted for a long time.
There were a few periods during the 20th century when bond yields fell to a
rate similar to the near-zero yields of today, but these were generally caused
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Figure 3.1. Average cost of purchasing $1,000 in ten-year Treasury income, dividends,
and corporate earnings
Source: Federal Reserve of St. Louis (2017).

by a ﬂight to safety during each of the World Wars and the Great Depression. The current era is unique in that low bond yields and high stock
valuations are occurring in tandem for an extended period. This suggests
an increase in demand for all ﬁnancial assets.

Life Cycle Implications
A reasonable goal for most households is to save and spend in a manner that
roughly smooths spending (as a proxy for one’s standard of living) over a
lifetime, giving rise to retirement saving. Forward-looking workers will
understand that their lifestyles cannot be maintained by social security
alone, so they will set money aside during their working years to avoid
spending reductions in retirement.
Among other factors, decisions about optimal lifetime saving and spending depend on future salary, retirement length, and the investment rate of
return. Given a salary proﬁle and length of life, higher investment returns
will allow a household to save less while accumulating the same wealth at
retirement. For example, if a household earns $50,000 at age 25, expects
3 percent annual salary growth, and seeks $1 million at age 65, this can be
achieved with a 10 percent annual savings rate when investments return
5 percent. But if returns are only 2 percent, the required savings rate
increases to 18 percent to reach this goal.
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Figure 3.2. Cost of funding retirement income to various ages with a $1 million bond
ladder
Source: Authors’ calculations.

Lower returns will also reduce the income generated from $1 million
from age 65. Figure 3.2 shows the amount of income a retiree can purchase
using a bond ladder at real interest rates from 0 to 5 percent for a duration
of 30 years (until age 95), 35 years (to age 100), and 40 years (to age 105).
Sustainable income falls from $61,954 to only $38,364 as rates fall from
5 percent to 1 percent. Extending the ladder to age 100 or 105 not only
reduces the income that can be withdrawn each year at 5 percent ($58,164
and $55,503), but also increases the income spread compared to a 1 percent
expected return ($33,667 and $30,154). Longer retirements are particularly
hard hit by lower asset returns.
Figure 3.3 shows how optimal spending levels are reduced with lower rates
of return, and the varying impact of asset returns on the cost of funding a
legacy goal. Because workers need fewer dollars today to fund a dollar of
spending in the future, higher rates of return allow a saver to spend more
before and after retirement. Although the difference between a 6 percent
and a 4 percent real rate of return appears modest, this two-percentage-point
drop in returns results in a 9.1 percent decrease in lifetime spending (from
$46,938 to $42,653) with no bequest and an 11.6 percent decrease in lifetime
spending (from $46,008 to $40,572) with a $500,000 bequest. If real lifetime
rates fell to 2 percent, lifetime spending would drop by 22.2 percent ($36,538)
compared to a 6 percent real rate of return and by 34 percent ($32,195) with
a $500,000 bequest. Low lifetime real rates of return will have a signiﬁcantly
larger impact on the spending of households that hope to leave a bequest.
Income replacement rates at retirement also fall with lower expected
returns if the retiree seeks to smooth his lifetime standard of living (see
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Figure 3.3. Optimal spending by expected real portfolio return and legacy goal
Note: Calculations assume a 30-year career followed by a 30-year retirement, a starting salary
of $50,000, and real salary growth of 1 percent. Rates of return are deﬁned in real terms, and
retirement spending adjusts for inﬂation. The legacy goal reﬂects the value of investment
assets targeted to remain at the end of retirement.
Source: Authors’ calculations.

Figure 3.4). Planners therefore should consider the need to adjust replacement rates downward if they anticipate a low return environment during
the retirement planning process. While optimal replacement rates at a
6 percent real portfolio return are near the 70 percent replacement rate
rule of thumb, a 2 percent real portfolio return will result in an optimal
replacement rate of about 55 percent when there is no bequest motive. At a
0 percent real portfolio return, the optimal replacement rate is a bit above
40 percent. With a legacy goal of $500,000, the optimal replacement rate
falls further to 31 percent.
Finally, a perhaps counterintuitive result of our life cycle simulations in a
low-return environment is that households will need to accumulate more
wealth by the time they retire in order to maintain even a lower standard
of living in retirement—particularly if they hope to leave a legacy. At a
2 percent expected real rate of portfolio return, the household must save
just over $1 million by retirement with a $500,000 legacy goal, while a
household expecting a 6 percent real rate of return will need to save just
over $750,000. The amount of savings required in a low return environment
as shown in Figure 3.5 (the difference between income and spending) needs
to be much higher to fund a larger nest egg in order to pay for a more
expensive retirement. As noted, the amount that the household can spend
each year in this more expensive retirement is also more modest.
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Figure 3.4. Income replacement rates and legacy goal
Note: Calculations assume a 30-year career followed by a 30-year retirement, a starting salary
of $50,000, and real salary growth of 1 percent. Rates of return are deﬁned in real terms,
and retirement spending adjusts for inﬂation. The legacy goal reﬂects the value of investment
assets targeted to remain at the end of retirement.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 3.5. Total savings required to fund lifetime spending goal at retirement
by legacy goal
Note: Calculations assume a 30-year career followed by a 30-year retirement, a starting salary of
$50,000, and real salary growth of 1 percent. Rates of return are deﬁned in real terms, and
retirement spending adjusts for inﬂation. The legacy goal reﬂects the value of investment assets
targeted to remain at the end of retirement.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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What is a reasonable portfolio return assumption? From the investor’s
perspective, the choice should be net of inﬂation, investment expenses,
asset management fees, and taxes. Real interest rates can be found using
the yield curve for Treasury Inﬂation-protected Securities (TIPS). With a
1 percent rate and longer-term maturities, investment and asset management fees may result in negative real returns. Expected real equity returns
may be in the range of perhaps 2–4 percent net of asset fees and inﬂation. It
is reasonable to evaluate the planning consequences of a future 0 percent to
2 percent real future portfolio return.

Changes in Longevity
While the length of the retirement life cycle stage is unknown at the time of
retirement, the cost of funding an income stream rises as expected longevity
rises. A longer lifetime gives workers three choices. They can retire later;
they can retire at the same age as yesterday’s retiree and spend less; or they
can retire at the same age and accept a greater risk of outliving assets while
maintaining the same lifestyle. None of these choices results in a better
retirement than the high return environment would.
Life expectancies for Americans who reach the age of 65 rose signiﬁcantly
during the twentieth century. In addition, higher-income earners are living
longer than lower earners, as indicated in Figure 3.6. This relatively recent
trend (Chetty et al. 2016) in which higher-earning Americans are seeing the
largest improvements in longevity raises the cost of retirement for those who
5
Difference versus Average
Life Expectancy

4
3
2
1
0
–1
–2
–3
–4
–5

0

20

40
60
Household Income Percentile
Male

80

100

Female

Figure 3.6. Differences in life expectancies by household income for a 65-year-old
man and woman
Source: Human Longevity Project (2017).
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Figure 3.7. The cost of buying $1 in real annuity income at age 65 over time
Source: Blanchett et al. (2017).

rely the most on savings to maintain their spending in retirement. Since
social security provides a larger income replacement rate for lower-income
workers, increases in longevity raise the cost of retirement for those who
need to replace the largest portion of their retirement income with savings.
The simultaneous improvement in longevity coupled with the decline in
real interest rates on bonds raise the cost of buying an annuitized income
stream in retirement. Figure 3.7 reports the cost of buying $1 in lifetime
income via an inﬂation-adjusted annuity using mortality-weighted net present value of cash ﬂows. Using historical mortality tables from the Social
Security Administration (2015), historical bond Treasury yields from the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2017), and historical implied inﬂation
estimates from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2017), we calculate
the cost of buying safe real income between 1982 and 2015. Observed
annuity payouts offered by annuity companies differ slightly, but they are
very similar to the prices of annuities using data from Immediateannuities.
com (2017).
Our results show that rising longevity and falling real interest rates have
doubled the cost of buying safe income over the last 35 years. In other words, a
retiree today who hopes to fund expenses through safe investments will need
to save twice as much, all else equal, if he or she expects to retire at age 65.
It may be tempting for retirees to avoid annuitizing wealth at retirement
when the cost of buying safe income is so high. In reality, annuitizing safe
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investments becomes even more important when interest rates are low. This
is because building a bond ladder, an alternative to annuitization, is also
more expensive when interest rates are low. But the difference between the
cost of buying a bond ladder to fund spending, particularly spending in old
age, and buying income through an annuity widens as interest rates fall. In
other words, the mortality credit that allows a retiree to spend a higher
percentage of his or her income than he or she could receive from a bond
ladder becomes relatively more important when interest rates are low.

Estimated Increases in Optimal Savings Rates
Many assumptions in this life cycle model are unrealistic. We have not
included Social Security income, which provides an income cushion that
softens the blow of low asset returns. We also omit differences in taxation
before and after retirement, and we do not consider the natural decrease in
spending that most retirees experience as their physical and cognitive
abilities decline in old age.
To address these complexities, we have built a model to estimate the
required savings rate needed to fund a spending amount after tax that
smooths consumption immediately after retirement and then maintains a
typical retiree’s subsequent declining spending path (Blanchett and Idzorek
2015). It also incorporates the impact of progressive taxation at different
levels of income before and after retirement, and it estimates the amount
of Social Security income that a retiree at different levels of income can
expect to receive. We assume that all savings are pre-tax (e.g., in a Traditional 401(k) or IRA). A more detailed description of assumptions is
provided in the Appendix.
In line with the observed decline in real spending that occurs during
retirement (Blanchett 2014), we assume that real spending needs fall each
year in retirement. Earnings paths are based on empirically observed
changes in pay by age and level of income. We also assume that the amount
of annual savings rises with income over the life cycle. Since longevity is
expected to improve for future workers, we assume younger workers will
have to fund more years of spending in retirement if they retire at a given
age. Since higher-income workers will also live longer, we assume that
higher earners will need to fund more years of retirement spending.
American retirees rarely annuitize their savings to provide guaranteed
income throughout retirement, and hence, a certain percentage of retirees
will outlive their savings. This requires us to establish an acceptable probability of depleting savings during retirement in order to generate a lifetime
spending path. Our simulations set this probability at 20 percent. A lower
probability would result in higher estimated savings rates. Mortality rates
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for single households are based on gender-neutral mortality, while mortality
rates for a married household assume one male and one female of the
same age.
Asset returns are estimated using an autoregressive model (Blanchett
et al. 2013), calibrated so that one return series approximates the historical
averages; it includes three additional scenarios of low, medium, and high
expected returns. The high scenario has returns similar to long-term averages but incorporates today’s low bond yields. We also include a 50 bp
portfolio fee, so workers will need to save more than our estimates in
order to pay higher fees on savings.
Worker’s portfolios are assumed to decrease the fraction of risky assets
nearing retirement. The allocation is based on the Morningstar Moderate
Lifetime Index glide path, which takes into account the present value of
human capital as a bond-like asset to generate optimal asset allocations over
the life cycle (Morningstar 2015).
We estimate savings rates for scenarios that include low, moderate, and
historical asset returns. In the low and moderate simulations, bond yields
begin at a 2 percent real rate of return. In the low return scenario, the mean
real return starts at 2 percent and follows a random distribution that rises to
3.5 percent at the 75th percentile and 5.25 percent at the 95th percentile
(or falls to 1 percent at the 5th percentile). In the moderate return scenario,
the real return rises to 4 percent on average. Since rates of return on longduration corporate securities are currently below the mean expectations in
the low return scenario, our projected saving rates using these rates of
returns may underestimate the saving needed if the low return environment
persists.

Results
Table 3.1 provides results for workers at various age and income levels who
intend to retire at age 65. Optimal saving rates using historical data for
joint households who start saving at age 25 are between 4.3 percent for
low earners ($25,000), up to 9 percent for high earners ($250,000), and
between 6.8 percent and 8.8 percent for singles. Higher-income households
must save more because Social Security replaces a smaller percentage of
income and because of progressive taxation.
We assume moderate returns increase the optimal saving rate by
63 percent, to 7.0 percent for couples with $25,000 of household income,
and by 82 percent, to a 16.4 percent savings rate for couples earning
$250,000. For most higher-income workers, a persistent low return environment results in workers optimally contributing up to the limit of their
employer-sponsored retirement contributions even if they begin saving at a

TABLE . Target total pre-tax savings rates for various households just starting to
save for retirement
25 Years Old
Single Household

Household
Income
($0,000s)

$25
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250

Joint Household

Returns

Returns

Historical Low Mid

Historical Low Mid

6.8
8.1
8.2
8.8
9.0
9.3

11.3
14.2
14.9
15.9
16.4
16.8

9.0 Household
11.2 Income
11.4 ($0,000s)
12.1
12.7
13.0

$25
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250

4.3
6.4
6.9
8.0
8.7
9.0

7.0 5.7
10.9 8.6
12.5 9.7
14.2 11.2
15.6 12.0
16.4 12.7

30 Years Old
Single Household

Household
Income
($0,000s)

$25
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250

Joint Household

Returns

Returns

Historical Low Mid

Historical Low Mid

7.4
9.9
10.1
11.0
11.4
11.7

12.2
17.0
17.6
18.7
19.2
19.5

9.9 Household
13.5 Income
14.0 ($0,000s)
14.6
15.4
15.7

$25
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250

4.2
7.2
8.5
9.6
10.6
11.3

6.6
12.1
14.3
16.9
18.1
18.8

5.5
9.6
11.5
13.2
14.2
15.0

35 Years Old
Single Household

Household
Income
($0,000s)

$25
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250

Joint Household

Returns

Returns

Historical Low Mid

Historical Low Mid

8.9
12.1
12.5
13.2
13.9
14.3

13.6
18.1
20.4
22.2
23.7
24.1

11.3 Household
15.8 Income
17.1 ($0,000s)
17.8
18.4
18.8

$25
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250

4.2
8.6
10.0
11.8
12.8
13.7

6.3
13.1
16.8
19.0
21.1
23.5

5.0
11.1
13.4
15.4
17.4
18.3

40 Years Old
Single Household

Household
Income
($0,000s)

$25
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250

Joint Household

Returns

Returns

Historical Low Mid

Historical Low Mid

10.4
13.9
16.5
17.6
18.1
18.5

Source : Blanchett et al. (2017).

14.8
19.4
25.6
26.4
27.3
27.5

12.8 Household
17.5 Income
20.4 ($0,000s)
22.8
24.3
24.8

$25
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250

4.3
9.4
12.6
14.5
16.4
17.6

6.3
12.4
19.0
23.8
25.5
26.4

4.9
11.2
16.5
18.6
20.1
22.8
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TABLE . Impact of retirement ages on target total pre-tax savings rates for a
35-year-old (%)
Retire at Age 60
Single Household

Household
Income
($0,000s)

$25
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250

Joint Household

Returns

Returns

Low Mid Historical

Low Mid Historical

21.7
24.6
25.9
25.8
25.9
25.9

17.8
19.1
20.7
20.1
20.5
20.7

14.1
16.9
16.3
16.2
16.3
16.4

Household
Income
($0,000s)

$25
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250

18.3
21.4
24.8
25.6
25.9
26.0

14.9
18.2
19.2
19.6
19.9
20.5

12.0
15.0
15.0
15.5
16.1
16.4

Retire at Age 65
Single Household

Household
Income
($0,000s)

$25
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250

Joint Household

Returns

Returns

Low Mid Historical

Low Mid Historical

13.6
18.1
20.4
22.2
23.7
24.1

11.3
15.8
17.1
17.8
18.4
18.8

9.1
12.3
13.2
13.8
14.3
14.8

Household
Income
($0,000s)

$25
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250

6.3
13.1
16.8
19.0
21.1
23.5

5.0
11.1
13.4
15.4
17.4
18.3

4.3
8.9
10.7
12.1
13.4
14.2

Retire at Age 60
Single Household

Household
Income
($0,000s)

$25
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250

Joint Household

Returns

Returns

Low Mid Historical

Low Mid Historical

6.2
12.7
15.9
18.3
19.8
21.4

4.8
10.6
12.8
14.7
16.6
17.6

4.2
8.7
10.3
11.7
12.8
13.6

Household
Income
($0,000s)

$25
0.0 0.0
$50
3.8 2.8
$100 9.1 7.4
$150 13.8 11.3
$200 17.2 13.8
$250 18.7 15.4

0.0
2.0
6.3
9.1
11.1
12.2

Source: Blanchett et al. (2017).

young age. Workers relying on historical returns to estimate optimal savings
would believe that they needed to save much less than is needed to preserve
their lifestyle after retirement.
The increase in saving needed to fund retirement is even more dramatic if
households begin saving for retirement at ages 35 or 40. Now optimal saving
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rates rise to 24.1 percent, in the low return simulation, versus 14.3 percent
using historical returns for a single worker who begins saving at age 35. If the
household waits until age 40, the optimal savings rate rises to 27.5 percent.
Even in a moderate return scenario, optimal savings rates are 24.8 percent
for a single household and 22.8 percent for a couple. Both single and joint
households who use historical asset returns to project optimal savings rates
would save near the employee contribution limit for those with incomes of
$100,000. At lower interest rates, this amount of saving is not nearly enough
to sustain a lifestyle for those retiring at age 65.
Fortunately, most workers are able to defer retirement to a later age. This
allows them to save less during their working years, resulting in an improved
lifestyle both before and after retirement. Despite deferring retirement for a
few years, increases in longevity will not necessarily result in fewer years spent
in retirement. For this reason, a reasonable alternative is to delay retirement
since doing so increases the number of years of savings (and asset growth),
reduces expected longevity, and increases Social Security income. Table 3.2
shows how optimal savings can be reduced (or lifestyle today can be improved)
by delaying retirement for a household that begins to save at age 35.
A couple earning $250,000 could reduce its saving rate from 26 to
18.7 percent if it deferred retirement from age 60 to 70. The beneﬁts of
deferring retirement are even greater in a low return environment.
A couple using historical rates would need to save 16.4 percent of income
to retire at age 60, versus 12.2 percent if it retired at age 70. Workers who are
shown realistic projections of lower expected returns may be more likely to
choose a later retirement date, while those who project their retirement
savings using historical returns may falsely believe that modest savings rates
will allow them to retire at age 65.

Conclusion
In recent decades, prices for stocks and bonds have risen well above their
historical averages. Higher asset prices imply lower expected future asset
returns, so workers who rely on historical asset returns to project optimal
retirement savings are at risk of unexpected shortfalls.1 Improvements in
longevity have also increased the cost of retiring at a given age. Workers,
employers, and policymakers who rely on historical asset returns to make
saving recommendations may fail to recognize how sensitive optimal savings
rates are to persistent low investment returns. Our simple life cycle framework suggests that saving rates would need to rise by roughly two-thirds for
most Americans given persistent low returns. Also, higher-income workers
are most at risk of under-saving if they use historical asset return projections.
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Appendix: Methodology and Data Details
We build on the model of Blanchett and Idzorek (2015) in our analysis.
Retirement income goal. Our model assumes that the individual seeks to
maintain his or her level of after-tax (i.e., take-home) pay during retirement,
compared to his or her after-tax income immediately before retirement.
Retirement is assumed to commence at age 65.2
Change in annual retirement income need. Many retirement income models
assume that retiree consumption (i.e., the annual retirement income need)
increases annually with inﬂation throughout retirement (i.e., constant real
spending), yet Blanchett (2014), among others, suggest that actual retiree
spending need not increase by inﬂation throughout retirement. Our model
assumes that retirees tend to decrease spending in retirement in real terms,
although the relationship varies by the total level of household spending.
In particular, we assume that the annual retirement spending need
changes (ΔAS) during retirement for a given age (Age) and for a given
target spending level (SpendTar) as follows where the maximum annual
real change is +1 percent and the minimum annual real change is 1
percent:
ΔAS ¼ 0:00008ðAge 2 Þ  ð0:0125 * AgeÞ  0:0066 InðSpendTar Þ þ 54:6%
½A1
Figure 3A.1 shows how the real retirement income need changes for three
target spending levels: $25,000, $50,000, and $100,000 from ages 65 to 100.
Income growth model. To trace workers’ earnings over the life cycle, we
have estimated regressions using data from the IPUMS-CPS (Flood et al.
2015). To be included in the analysis, individuals had to be coded as
employed, working at least 20 hours a week in all jobs, and have annual
total wage compensation of at least $5,000.3
It is assumed that an individual in a given earnings percentile (e.g., the
15th percentile) remains in that percentile for his or her entire working
career (see Figure 3A.2).
Savings growth model. A common assumption in retirement planning models
is that deferral rates remain constant as the individual ages. Nevertheless, this
does not track actual investor behavior. Our research suggests that a more
realistic accrual path has saving rates increase by approximately 25 percent
over 10 years. For example, a 35-year-old saving 10 percent of pay would be
assumed to be saving 12.27 percent at age 45, but only 1.56 percent by age 55.
Retirement period. The base mortality table used for this analysis is the
Social Security Administration 2013 Periodic Life Table (Social Security
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Administration 2015). Mortality rates in the future are assumed to decline
based on the G2 projection scale in the Society of Actuaries 2012 Individual
Annuity Mortality Table (Society of Actuaries 2012). We further adjust
mortality rates by a constant factor so that life expectancies are allowed to
vary by income level.
Returns model. Three types of series were created for this analysis: bonds,
stocks, and inﬂation. For bond returns, we ﬁrst select an initial bond
yield (i.e., seed value) for the simulation. This is the bond yield at the
beginning of the retirement simulation based approximately on 10-year US
bonds. For simulation purposes, the historical yield seed is assumed to be
5 percent.
Yields for subsequent years are based on equation (1.1), where εYld is an
independent white noise that follows a normal distribution with a mean of 0
and a standard deviation of 1.25 percent:
Yldt ¼ α þ β1 Yldt1 þ β2 Yldt1 2 þ εY

½1:1

The resulting annual bond yield (Yldt ) is assumed to be bounded between
1.0 and 10.0 percent.4

Annual Real Retirement Need

$1.1

$1.0

$0.9

$0.8

$0.7

$0.6

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

Age
$25,000 Spend

$50,000 Spend

$100,000 Spend

Figure 3A.1. The Spending Smile: lifetime real income target for various spending
levels
Source: Blanchett (2014).
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Figure 3A.2. Earnings curves at various income percentiles
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (2015).

After the bond yield for a given year is determined, the bond return (rbond )
is estimated using equation (1.2), where εbond is assumed to have a mean of
0.0 percent and standard deviation of 1.5 percent:
rbond ¼ Yldt1 þ  8:0ðYldt  Yldt1 Þ þ εbond

½1:2

The 1.5 percent standard deviation for the error term (εb ) is not the
assumed standard deviation for the asset class (bonds, in this case); rather
it is the standard deviation for the errors around the regression estimates.
The actual standard deviation of bond returns of 10.0 percent is higher
because other factors (such as the yield and the change in yield) affect the
actual variability of returns.
The stock return model is based on the yield for a given year plus the
assumed equity risk premium (ERP). Therefore, we assume the following
levels of ERP for the analysis:

ERP

Historical Low Mid High
5.5%
3.5% 4.5% 5.5%

Stock returns each year are based on equation (1.3), where εstock is assumed
to have a mean of 5 percent and standard deviation of 20 percent, where
Yldt is the average yield for all years in that scenario:
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rstocks;t ¼ ( þ εstocks

½1:3

Yldt

The inﬂation model is based on the loose historical relation between bond
yields and inﬂation and is depicted in equation (1.4), where εi is an independent white noise term that follows a standard normal distribution with a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of 0.5 percent:
ri ¼ 0:6% þ þ 0:5Yldt1 þ εi

½1:4

Additional structure. Social Security retirement beneﬁts are estimated based
on the highest assumed average 35 years of earnings for each simulated
participant. Social Security retirement beneﬁts are estimated using the 2015
bend points (bps) and assumed to commence at age 65 on retirement.
The required level of retirement savings is determined using a solver
routine, which determines the amount of savings or balance required to
achieve an 80 percent probability of success during retirement.5
For simplicity, our model assumes that all savings are Roth contributions.
For some scenarios, the individual is unlikely to have accounts sufﬁcient to
fund the Roth (e.g., if he or she needs to save $50,000). Portfolio allocations
follow the Morningstar Moderate Lifetime Index glide path. The portfolio
fee is 50 bps.

Notes
1. For a model which endogenizes retirement, work, and saving in a low return
environment, see Horneff et al.’s Chapter 8 of this volume.
2. Alternative replacement levels are explored by Aon Consulting (2008) and
Blanchett et al. (2013), among others.
3. The income deﬁnition is per individual (not household) and it only includes wage
income (i.e., it excludes non-wage income such as pension beneﬁts).
4. The coefﬁcients vary by model type, as below:
Historical Low
α
β1
β2

0.25%
0.95
0.00

Mid

High

0.30% 0.30% 0.40%
0.55
0.65
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.65

5. While 80 percent may seem like a relatively aggressive estimate (e.g., some
researchers use probability-of-success metrics that exceed 95 percent), it is important to look at the combined impact of the assumptions, and not to focus on a single
assumption in isolation. For example, two of the most important assumptions when
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estimating the cost of retirement are the assumed length of retirement and the
target safety level (i.e., the target probability of success). Since the length of
retirement period is relatively conservative (i.e., much longer than true life expectancy) the target success level need not be as conservative (e.g., it is possible to
target an 80 percent chance of success versus a 95 percent chance of success). It is
also important not to be too conservative with respect to assumptions (e.g.,
assuming a 99 percent probability of success), given the potential impact on
consumption during retirement. After all, dying at an advanced age with a major
portion of savings untouched is another form of retirement ‘failure’ (except, of
course, in the case of a planned bequest).
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